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To cite this article: Soner Çağaptay (2002) Reconfiguring the Turkish nation in the 1930s, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8:2, 67-82, DOI: 10.1080/13537110208428662

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537110208428662

Published online: 24 Dec 2007.
Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s

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This article studies Turkish nationalism during the 1930s. In this decade of Kemalism par excellence or High Kemalism, the rise of ethnicist nationalism in Turkey was accompanied by the ascent of the ‘Turkish history thesis’. The article presents an analysis of Turkish nationalism in this era through Ankara's population resettlement policies. Consequently, it examines Turkish nationalism through the interaction between the Kemalist state and the country’s minorities.

‘The Kurds of the Eastern provinces, the Arabs of South-Eastern Anatolia, the Moslems from Russia, the territories detached under the Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek islands, Greece, the Balkans and Roumania will be scattered among pure Turkish populations, so that they may lose the characteristics of the countries and districts of their birth, and, in a generation, be Turkish in speech, dress, habits and outlook, indistinguishable from their old-established neighbours. ... By the present policy ... Turkey hopes to build up a well-populated and homogeneous state.’

Nationalism during the Kemalist era is a crucial episode of recent Turkish history, whose legacy seems to have imprinted itself on modern Turkey. Whereas some students of Turkish studies assert that Turkish nationalism in this decade promoted a territorial definition of the nation, others claim that Islam, more than anything, defined Turkishness in this era. In this paper, I will argue that a juxtaposition of territory, religion and ethnicity in the 1930s produced a definition of the Turkish nation that was more nuanced than that suggested by either of these approaches. In doing this, I will focus on a largely ignored aspect of the 1930s and study Turkish nationalism, primarily, through the practices of the Turkish state.

Immediately after the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal ( Atatürk) and his Kemalist cadres started to mould Turkey...
into a nation-state. However, it was during the High Kemalist years, ‘Kemalism par excellence’, of the 1930s, that nationalism grew into Turkey’s official ideology. From 1931, when Turkey’s ruling Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) began to consolidate its monopoly of power, until 1938, when Atatürk died, the idea that the Turks were a glorious nation rose to prominence.

As late as 1912, Turkey (Anatolia and Thrace) had been part of the vast multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. Muslims (Turks, Kurds and others) and Christians (Greeks, Armenians, and the others who made up 20 per cent of its population) coexisted in Turkey. Fifteen years later, in 1927, the Christian population in the country had dropped to as little as 2.64 per cent. The Armenian catastrophe and the departure of most Greeks from Turkey, events, which Horowitz describes as ‘ethnic homogenization, religious singularity and nationalization’ had irreversibly changed Turkey. Another demographic change during this period was caused by an influx of Muslim immigrants. Throughout the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, many Ottoman Muslims, including Turks, but also Bosnian, Greek, Serbian, Macedonian, Albanian and Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks), who faced extermination in the newly independent Balkan states, fled to Anatolia. In addition, many Turks, Circassians and other Muslims arrived in Anatolia from the Black Sea basin. (These had been fleeing Russian expansionism in southern Russia, the Crimea and the Caucasus since the late eighteenth century.) The immigrants joined Turkey’s autochthonous Muslim groups of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Georgians and Lazès, and strengthened Anatolia’s Muslim and Turkish demographic base at the expense of its Christian communities. Because of these population shifts, by the 1920s, Turkey was home to a largely Turkish, yet multi-ethnic, Muslim majority. In this population, the Kurds were the most significant non-Turkish nationality. Hence, as a nation-state, Kemalist Turkey was bound to deal with the following issues:

- How would it accommodate the aforementioned Muslim immigrants?
- What would the relations be between it and autochthonous Muslims, especially the Kurds?
- And last but not least, did anybody in Turkey remember the Christians, especially the Armenians?

During the 1920s, with secularism as its corner stone, Kemalism turned its back on Islam as well as irredentism and promoted a territorial definition of the Turkish nation. An emphasis on Turkey (Anatolia and Thrace) became a visible tendency within Turkish nationalism. Article 88 of the Turkish constitution of 1924 stipulated that ‘the People of Turkey,
regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards Turkish citizenship'. Atatürk declared that ‘the people of Turkey, who have established the Turkish state, are called the Turkish nation’. He emphasized a shared past and interests and the desire to live together as the common denominators of the nation. The official definition of the Turkish nation focused on a voluntaristic-territorial formula. Accordingly, for instance, Article 5 of CHP’s 1927 by-laws stipulated that ‘the party was convinced that the strongest link among the citizens was unity in language, unity in feelings and unity in ideas’. Moreover, Article 88 of the Turkish Constitution dictated that persons ‘granted Turkish citizenship by law are Turks’. This is where the immigrant non-Turkish Muslims came in. The Kemalists saw it feasible to assimilate them into the Turkish nation. In fact, Islam had already been an avenue of inclusion in the Turkish nation. Being in Turkey had provided them with the elements of ‘assimilability under the Turkish language and Muslim religion’. In fact, by the 1920s very few immigrant non-Turkish Muslims still spoke their native languages.

The Kemalists expected that autochthonous Muslims would assimilate fast, too. In a speech to the Turkish parliament in 1920, Mustafa Kemal said: ‘You, the members of the high parliament, are not only Turks, or Circassians, or Kurds, or Lazes, you are the Islamic element made up of all these.’ Yet the local Muslims did not have similar incentives as the immigrant Muslims to merge into the Turkish nation. They had neither been uprooted from their homelands, nor lost their cultural and social structures due to expulsion. Additionally, these lived in compact territories. Among them, the Kurds were the majority in large parts of south-eastern Turkey. Of all the non-Turkish Muslim groups, they were the least unlikely to assimilate.

**The Rise of High Kemalism and the Turkish History Thesis**

In 1931, the Kemalist regime initiated a policy to centralize power in the hands of the ruling Republican People’s Party (CHP). This was the beginning of High Kemalism under Atatürk. This era was marked by the following developments: firstly, independent organizations and associations disbanded themselves and joined the ruling party; secondly, the wall between the CHP and the Turkish state gradually collapsed – between 1935 and 1937 the CHP moved to merge with the state; thirdly, during this era, Kemalist nationalism was redefined and played a bigger role than before in Turkish politics.

The emergence of the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ marked the redefinition and ascendancy of Turkish nationalism. The thesis stressed that the Turks were a great and ancient race. One of its seminal works, Türk Tarihinin
Ana Hatlarna Methal (‘Introduction to the General Themes of Turkish History’) claimed that thousands of years ago the Turks had lived in Central Asia, where they had created a bright civilization around an inner sea. When this inner sea had dried up due to climatic changes, they had left Central Asia and moved in all directions to civilize the rest of the world. They had gone to China in the East; to India in the South; to Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, Anatolia, Greece and Italy in the West. Thus, the Turkish race was the creator of civilizations in these lands, as well in Anatolia, which was the Turkish homeland since the Turks were its autochthonous population. Over time, the Turks had ‘crossed with other races’; however, the Turkish language had preserved their memories, cultural characteristics and everything else that made them a nation, including the Turks’ most cherished possession, the Turkish intellect. Since the Turkish language had preserved the nation, one had to speak it to prove that one was of ethnic Turkish descent and was eligible for membership in the Turkish nation.

This ethnicist definition of the nation through language put non-Turkish speakers in a precarious position. Yet the Kemalist regime did not view non-Turks as an undifferentiated mass. It saw the Muslims and the non-Muslims differently. Lectures given by Recep (Peker) (1888–1950), secretary-general of the CHP and one of the prominent Kemalist ideologues, elaborated on this. Peker started in a positive, yet patronizing manner towards non-Muslims. ‘We need to voice our ideas towards our Christian and Jewish citizens with committed clarity. Our party sees these citizens as full Turks, on condition that they participate in what we have just expressed, the unity in language and in ideals.’ Then, however, Peker inserted a caveat. High Kemalism would have difficulty in considering non-Muslims as ethnic Turks, even when they participated in this unity:

> With warm love, we maintain our sincerely established interest in Turks who have different religions and have established independent states outside our boundaries, or have been the citizens of other states. However, we accept that according to historical evidence, which progresses daily, the matter of blood ties and historical links between us and these masses, who add up to large numbers, is not part of our debate today.

Next, Peker focused on non-Turkish Muslims. He saw them as Turks: ‘We accept as part of us those citizens in the contemporary Turkish political and social community who have had the idea that they are Kurds, Circassians and even Lazes and Pomaks, imposed on them. It is our duty to correct these false conceptions [among them]’ While the Kemalists believed that the Kurds (and the other non-Turkish Muslims) did not need to foster a separate ethnic identity, a Turkish dictionary published in 1930,
which described the Kurds as 'a population living around the Iranian border', exemplified the Kemalist attitude towards them.  

How did this position affect Turkey's ethnic and religious minorities? So far, I have focused on the ideology of High Kemalist nationalism. However, to better analyse the impact of Turkish nationalism on Turkey's ethno-religious diversity, one needs to look at the practices of the Kemalist state. An analysis of the relations between Ankara and the Kurds and Armenians, representing Turkey's Muslim and non-Muslim minorities, should help accomplish this. Here, I will focus on one aspect of this relationship, the Kemalist immigration and population resettlement policies.  

**Kemalist Immigration and Resettlement Policies, the Kurds and the Armenians**  
Throughout the 1920s and the 1930s, Muslim immigrants, mainly from the Balkans, continued to pour into Turkey. Between 1921 and 1939, 719,808 people arrived as immigrants. This was a huge influx given that in 1927, the country's population was 13,542,795. Faced with harassment and discrimination, Muslims in the Balkans left their homes to settle in Turkey. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey signed treaties with Greece, Bulgaria and Romania to facilitate emigration from these countries. Interestingly, these treaties make possible the emigration of Muslims, and not exclusively of Turks, from these countries. Despite their belief in the ethnic definition of nationhood, the Kemalists were aware of religion's role in nation-building in Turkey. Moreover, they desperately needed the numbers and the know-how of the Balkan Muslims. Thus they left the doors open for the non-Turkish Muslim immigrants from the Balkans.  

Ankara needed legislation to cope with the influx of immigrants. The first resettlement law was adopted on 31 May 1926. This law started by defining who could qualify as an immigrant. Its second article stated: ‘Those who don’t share the Turkish culture [hars] ... will not be admitted as immigrants.' Accordingly, this article qualified Turkish and Muslim (ex-Ottomans) as immigrants. Simultaneously, it prohibited the non-Muslim ex-Ottomans (including the Armenian survivors of the deportations of 1915, who were outside Turkey) from immigration into Turkey.  

Next, the resettlement law focused on domestic population issues. It dictated that the Ministry of Interior was authorized to relocate the nomadic tribes in Turkey. (The word nomad in republican jargon was a euphemism for the Kurds and occasional Gypsies, the only unsettled peoples in Turkey by the late 1920s). Consequently, this article opened the way for the gradual assimilation of the Kurds by allowing the government to uproot them from their homelands and resettle them elsewhere.
This idea of assimilation through relocation survived into the High Kemalism of the 1930s, when Turkishness was increasingly defined through ethnicity. A new resettlement law passed on 13 June 1934 demonstrated this. The first article of this law stated that ‘the Ministry of Interior is assigned the powers to correct ... the distribution and locale of the population in Turkey in accordance with membership of Turkish culture’. The law then designated three zones in Turkey where this policy was to be actualized. These were: Zone 1, set aside for ‘populations who share the Turkish culture’; Zone 2, for the ‘relocation and resettlement of populations which are to adopt the Turkish culture’; and Zone 3, which was closed to resettlement and habitation for ‘sanitary, economic, cultural, political, military and security’ reasons.

Article 7 of this law further emphasized Turkishness. This article, which dealt with aid to immigrants, stipulated that ‘those immigrants who belong to the Turkish race’ might settle wherever they wished, so long as they have not applied for material help from the government. However, ‘immigrants who do not belong to the Turkish race’ had to settle where the government had asked them to, whether or not they had requested aid from the government. In the minds of republican cadres, Turkishness was not about religion or voluntaristic declarations, it was about language and ethnicity.

However, even then Ankara allowed certain non-Turks as immigrants. The next article of the law highlighted this: ‘Following approval by the Ministry of Interior, settled or nomadic individuals of Turkish origin and settled persons who share the Turkish culture’ would qualify as immigrants. A close reading of this revealed that it banned the immigration of:

1. ‘Settled persons who do not share the Turkish culture’, i.e. Armenians and other non-Muslims; and
2. ‘Nomadic individuals of non-Turkish origin’, i.e. Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Circassians (and most other Caucasus Muslims), who were the major nomadic groups in Turkey’s vicinity during the 1930s.

Meanwhile, the article permitted the immigration of:

3. ‘Settled or nomadic individuals of Turkish origin’, i.e. ethnic Turks; and
4. ‘Settled persons who share the Turkish culture,’ i.e. Balkan Muslims and some of the Caucasus Muslims.

Due to humanitarian, ideological, demographic and economic reasons, the Kemalists felt compelled to let the Balkan Muslims (and some of the Caucasus Muslims) to immigrate to Turkey. The Kemalist euphemism for these was ‘settled persons who share the Turkish culture’. However, the idea was eventually to assimilate them by settling them in the midst of Turks. As
the law puts it, those ‘whose mother tongue is not Turkish might not establish towns, villages, and worker or artisan units’.

Next, the resettlement law addressed the Kurds. The Kemalists thought that they could assimilate the Kurds by mixing them with Turks, since the two shared a common cultural and religious identity. Article 9 of the resettlement law stated: ‘The Ministry of Interior is entitled to ... resettle nomads who do not share the Turkish culture, by spreading them around to Turkish towns and villages.’ In addition, an executive act issued in 1939 dictated the settlement of immigrant Turks in specific strategic areas in the east from where Kurds would be banished. This would create corridors of Turkishness into the Kurdish heartland. If, however, these policies failed, and when the Kurds (or others) proved troublesome, the Ministry of Interior was empowered to ‘deport nomads who do not share the Turkish culture outside the national boundaries’. Hence, the law dictated:

The Ministry of the Interior is entitled to take the necessary cultural, military, political, social and security measures against those who share the Turkish culture but speak a language other than Turkish, or against those who do not share the Turkish culture. These measures, not to be applied collectively, are resettlement and denaturalization.

High Kemalist praxis emphasized ethnicity and diminished the role of religion in the definition of the Turkish nation. ‘İskan Muafiyetleri Nizamnamesi’, the Statute on Exemptions from Settlement issued on 27
October 1934, supported this suggestion. Article 3 of the statute instructed Turkish consular offices on how to issue immigrant visas: ‘people who belong to the Turkish race’ were to be given immigration visas without approval from the Ministry of Interior, so long as they were not in need of material help upon their arrival in Turkey. However, ‘those who share the Turkish culture but do not belong to the Turkish race’ were not to be issued immigration visas without approval from the Ministry of Interior, even if they had declared that they would not need material help upon arrival in Turkey.53

Another executive act from 1930s, ‘Îskân ve Nüfus İşlerinin Süratle İkmâli Hakkûnda Tamim’, the Circular on the Speedy Disposal of Resettlement and Population Matters, also used ethnicity as a tool with which to view candidates for Turkish citizenship.54 This circular commanded local authorities to swiftly provide naturalization certificates to those immigrants who had not yet been naturalized. Its fourth article stipulated that ‘those who belong to the Turkish race, or those who share the Turkish culture, speak Turkish and know no other languages’ should receive their naturalization certificates without inspection.55 Pomaks, Bosnian Muslims, Crimean Tatars and Karapapaks56 should be treated likewise. As for Muslim Georgians, Lezgis, Chechens, Circassians and Abkhazes,57 these could get their papers only after having been investigated by the Ministry of Interior. On the other hand, Kurds, Arabs, Albanians and other non-Turkish-speaking Muslims, as well as Christians and Jews, were not to receive naturalization certificates or immigrant papers.

This established five hierarchical categories among the aspiring Turkish citizens (see Figure 2). The first category was ethnic Turks, who were entitled to receive naturalization papers immediately. The second group included the Crimean Tatars and Karapapaks, speakers of an Eastern Anatolian dialect, were welcome since they were ethnically related to the Turks. The third category consisted of Balkan Muslims: the Pomaks and the Bosnians. Though not ethnically Turkish, these were seen as easy to assimilate as they lacked strong national movements or independent states with which they could identify. Consequently, they were to receive their papers on the spot.

The fourth category included the Caucasus Muslims: Georgians, Lezgis, Chechens, Circassians and Abkhazes. Like the Pomaks and the Bosnians, these also did not have independent homelands. Moreover, they, too, were numerically small groups without strong nationalist movements (the Circassians, with their powerful national sentiments and large numbers, were an exception). Besides, there were still vestiges of nomadism among them. Ankara disfavoured nomads. Accordingly, with its preference for the Balkans over the Caucasus, and for the settled over the nomadic, the republic exerted caution towards the mostly nomadic Caucasus Muslims.
FIGURE 2: 
PRIORITY IN IMMIGRATION

1. Turks
2. Turkic groups (Tatars, Karapakas)
3. Stateless Balkan Muslims
   (Pomaks, Bosnians, etc)

4. Caucasus Muslims
   ALLOWED WITH INSPECTION

5. Kurds, Arabs,
   Albanians,
   Jews, Christians
   NOT ALLOWED

Thus these could receive their papers, only after having been investigated. As for the fifth and the last category, this included Armenians and other Christians, Jews, Kurds and various other Muslims, who were not to receive naturalization papers under any circumstances. Of these, the Christians and the Jews were in this list of non-desirables for a simple reason. Turkey wanted to see their population diminish, not increase. The Muslims in this group were those whom the Turkish republic considered difficult to assimilate and hence a potential threat. The Albanians and Arabs had independent states and strong nationalist movements; thus their assimilation would not proceed smoothly. Last but not least, the republic was especially careful towards the Kurds, the second largest and the least assimilated ethnic group in Turkey. Turkey banned Kurds from immigration, to arrest the growth of its own Kurdish community.

Conclusion

It appears that High Kemalism had three definitions of the Turkish nation. The first of these was territorial. This was embodied in the Turkish
constitution of 1924, which registered all inhabitants of Turkey as Turks. It promised to accommodate the Kurds, the Armenians and all the others as equal citizens of the republic. The second definition, less inclusive than the first, was religious. Due to the legacy of the *Millet* system, the Kemalists saw all Muslims in Turkey as Turks. This definition had an internal conflict: although all Turks were Muslims, not all Muslims were Turkish-speaking. The third and the least inclusive definition was ethno-religious. First, High Kemalist praxis saw only those who were *ethnically Turkish* as Turks. Second, it used religion to classify non-Turks into two hierarchical categories as Muslims and non-Muslims. It favoured the former over the latter. Ethnic Turks were not a solid majority in Turkey. If the Kurds (and other Muslims) assimilated, they could enhance the Turkish population. For this reason, helped by the legacy of the *Millet* system, the Kemalists were willing to accept the Kurds as Turks if they adopted Turkish – albeit not forgetting that they were not ethnically Turkish. Accordingly, Kemalism remained cautious towards the Kurds. It screened them to prevent their number from increasing and their national identity from blossoming.

Kemalism had a less accepting attitude towards the Armenians (and other non-Muslims). Its praxis saw the Armenians as unsuitable for assimilation since they lacked the sine qua non of Turkishness, Islam.

**FIGURE 3:**
**ZONES OF TURKISHNESS IN THE 1930s**
Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s

Paradoxically, religion created an ethnic boundary between the Armenians and the Turks. Turkish nationalism remained hostile to the Armenians, whom Turkey marginalized as a community. Subsequently, there are no direct references to the Armenians in the laws that I have analysed. There is however mention of their belongings under the heading ‘Ermeni metrukaty’ (deserted Armenian property).58

In this article I have analysed the Turkish nationalism of the High Kemalist era and its interaction with the country’s minorities. I have focused on the different definitions of Turkishness during 1930s. It appears that High Kemalism produced three concentric zones of Turkishness (see Figure 3): an outer territorial one, a middle religious one, and an inner ethnic one. In this scheme, only when a group was located in the innermost ethnic zone did it enjoy close proximity to the Turkish state. Alternatively, the further away a group was from the centre, the more unaccommodating was the Turkish state towards it. Moreover, while groups from the religious layer were expected eventually to move into the inner ethnic core, groups from the territorial zone were strictly confined to the hostile margins of the Turkish society. Perhaps this explains why the Turkish state remains unsympathetic to the idea of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group. It also makes clear why Turkey treats its Armenians, however numerically insignificant they may be today, with suspicion.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Ayhan Aktar of Marmara University, Istanbul, and Dr Hakan M. Yavuz of University of Utah, Salt Lake City, for reading various drafts of this paper and offering me valuable feedback on it.

Notes

4. It should be noted that although the study of the practices of the Turkish state in the 1930s has, so far, been ignored, the recent years have witnessed the emergence of new and refreshing works that employ this approach. Some examples of such works include Rifat N. Bali, Cumhuriyet Yillarýnda Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleþirme Serüveni (1923–1945)
5. A number of other factors differentiate the High Kemalist era of the 1930s from Kemalism in the 1920s. Firstly, during 1920s, Turkey was busy recovering from an era of extensive fighting since the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Accordingly, after 1923, the Kemalist regime focused its energy on establishing a new, secular, republic and Turkey went through a period of fundamental physical and political restructuring. (To achieve this, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk carried out a number of reforms. These included the abolition of the Caliphate and the expulsion of members of the Ottoman dynasty on 1 March 1924 and the elimination of the shariah courts on 8 April 1924. In addition, on 17 February 1926, the Turkish parliament voted for a new secular civil code, and on 10 April 1928, it removed from the Turkish Constitution the clause that prescribed Islam as Turkey’s state religion. Last but not least, on 1 November 1928, Turkey replaced its Arabic-origin alphabet with a Latin-based one). These reforms kept the Kemalist regime busy. Hence only after a secular Turkish republic had been firmly established by the beginning of the 1930s did Kemalism turn its attention to matters of ideology and nationalism. A second difference between the 1920s and the 1930s was that during 1920s, Turkey experienced two brief, however tutelary, periods of multi-party democracy. The first of these involved the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkası – TpCF) on 17 November 1924, and the second, the foundation of the Free Republican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırsası – SCF) on 12 August 1930. Both of these periods ended abruptly, respectively, on 3 June 1925 and 17 November 1930. The end of the second multi-party attempt heralded a new era for the country: in 1931, as a single-party state, Kemalist Turkey was becoming more nationalist and authoritarian. This was the beginning of Kemalism par excellence.


8. Pomaks are Bulgarian Muslims, who live mostly in southern Bulgaria. Although they speak Bulgarian, historically, they have identified with the Muslim Turks and not with the Christian Bulgars. For more on the Pomaks, see Fehim Bajraktarević, ‘Pomaken’, Enzyklopädie des Islams/Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1st edn (1936). For a brief discussion of Pomaks in Turkey, see Peter Alford Andrews and Rüdiger Benninghaus (eds and comps), Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey (Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), pp.92–7.


10. Circassians are a Muslim nation of the North Caucasus. They speak a language that belongs to the north-west Caucasus family. For more on the Circassians in Turkey, see Andrews and Benninghaus, pp.167–171. For a discussion of the Circassian resistance to Russian


12. Lazes are a Muslim community who speak a language related to Georgian and Svan. They live along the eastern Black Sea coast of Turkey, next to the Georgian border. For more on the Lazes in Turkey, see Alexandre Toumarkine, *Les Lazes en Turquie* (Istanbul: Isis, 1995); Andrews and Benninghaus, pp.176–8; and Rüdiger Benninghaus, *The Laz: an Example of Multiple Identification*, in Andrews and Benninghaus, pp.497–502.


14. In 1927, although 86.42 per cent of its population, totalling 11,777,810 people, spoke Turkish, Turkey also had the following Muslim groups: 1,184,446 Kurdish speakers, 134,273 Arabic speakers, 95,901 Circassian speakers, 11,465 (Crimean) Tatar speakers, 21,774 Albanian speakers and 20,554 Bulgarian speakers. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık İçişleri Bakanlığı, *İstatistik Yılığı: Üçüncü Cilt* [Statistics Yearbook, Vol.3] (Istanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1930), p.56, and *İstatistik İlliği: İkinci Cilt 1929*, p.45. The 1935 census gives more detailed data on the heterogeneity of Muslims in Turkey. In 1935, the Turkish population was 16,157,450, of which 15,838,673 were Muslims. Turkish was the first language, spoken by 13,899,073 people, and Kurdish the second, spoken by 1,480,246 people. The other Muslim groups included 10,099 people who spoke Abkhaz (a north-west Caucasus language), 22,754 who spoke Albanian, 153,687 who spoke Arabic, 29,065 Bosnian speakers (of whom 4,452 spoke the Serbian and Croatian variants), 91,972 people who spoke Circassian, 57,325 who spoke Georgian, 2,053 who spoke Persian, 32,661 who spoke Pomak (Bulgarian) and 15,615 who spoke (Crimean) Tatar. Başbakanlık İçişleri Bakanlığı, *İstatistik Yılığı: İlliği: Cilt 10* [Statistics Yearbook, Vol.10] (Ankara: Hüsnüttabiat, 1938–39), pp.64–5.

15. In 1927, there were 1,184,446 Kurdish speakers in Turkey in a population of 13,542,795: *İstatistik Yılığı: İkinci Cilt 1929*, p.44.


17. Karpat, p.50. For more on the territorial definition of the Turkish nation during the Kemalist era, see Tachau.

18. *Turkey: Constitution: Translation into English of the Turkish Constitution of 1924, Embodying Such Amendments to the Text As Have Been Made to Date*, typescript (1937), p.9.

19. İnan, p.351.

20. Ibid., p.379.


23. Çağlar Keyder, ‘The Ottoman Empire’, in Mark von Hagen and Karen Barkey (eds), *After Empire* (Boulder; CO: Westview Press, 1997), p.36. Turkish nationalization under Islam’s influence resembled the definition of a nation-through-religion by most Balkan nationalist movements: David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p.57. The association of religion with nationality was due to the legacy of the millet system. This system had divided the Ottoman population into strict religious compartments, called millets. Before the modern era, the system’s longevity and overarching compartments had merged the pre-modern identities of the Ottoman peoples into religious ones. In the age of nationalism, however, these pre-modern identities resurfaced as religio-ethnic identities.
Subsequently, most Ottoman millets were transformed into nations during the last phases of the empire.

24. Although millions of (Turkish and non-Turkish) Muslims immigrated to Anatolia from the eighteenth century onwards – between 1876 and 1927 alone, a total of 1,994,999 Muslim immigrants arrived from the Balkans and the Black Sea basin: Cem Behar (comp.), The Population of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, Historical Statistics Series, Vol.2 (Ankara: State Institute of Statistics, 1996), pp.51, 62 – it is difficult to know how many of these were non-Turkish, since the Ottoman Empire did not keep statistics on the ethnic divisions of the Muslim immigrants. The first data on the ethnicity of the immigrant Muslims are from the 1927 census. In 1927, Turkey had 95,901 Circassian speakers, 21,774 Albanian speakers, 20,554 Bulgarian speakers (of whom a small number were Christian Bulgars) and 11,465 (Crimean) Tatar speakers. (There are no census data for Greek-speaking Muslims, whose size can be estimated. In 1927, there were 119,822 Greek speakers and 109,905 Greek-Orthodox Christians in Turkey. The difference between these two sums, 9,917 should roughly be the number of Greek-speaking Muslims: İstatistik Yılığı: 1934–5 Cilt 7, pp.158–61). On the other hand, according to the 1935 census, Muslims who spoke non-Anatolian languages totalled 238,901 people, or 1.5 per cent of the Turkish population of 16,157,450. İstatistik Yılığı Cilt 10, pp.64–5.


26. According to the 1927 census, the Kurds were the majority of the population in seven provinces of south-eastern Turkey. In these provinces, the biggest Kurdish majority was in Van, where the Kurds constituted 79.1 per cent of the population. In addition to these seven provinces, the Kurds made up significant minority communities in another seven Turkish provinces in Eastern Turkey. İstatistik Yılığı: 1934–5 Cilt 7, pp.160–1. Consequently, nearly 90 per cent of Turkey’s Kurds lived in these 14 provinces, containing ‘a third of Turkish territory but only a fifth of her people’: Donald Everett Webster, The Turkey of Atatürk (Philadelphia, PA: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), pp.48–9.

27. The most important of these was ‘Turkish Hearths’ (Türk Ocakları), the intellectual core of Turkish nationalism since 1912. The Hearths abolished themselves on 10 April 1931, and joined the CHP, which renamed them ‘The People’s Houses’ (Halkevleri). The People’s Houses became the CHP’s popular and nationalist propaganda machinery: Mete Tunçay, TürkiyeCumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması [The Establishment of a Single Party Regime in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), pp.306–9. For more on the Turkish Hearths, see Füsun Üstel, Türk Ocakları: 1912-1931 [Turkish Hearths 1912–1931] (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997). Also, for a treatment of the Turkish Hearths from a nationalist perspective, cf. Yusuf Sarınay, Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Tarihi Gelişimi ve Türk Ocakları 1912–1931 [The Historical Development of Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Hearths 1912–1931] (İstanbul: Ötüken, 1994).

28. The merger was initiated at the CHP’s Fourth Congress, which convened in Ankara, between 9 and 16 May 1935. The new programme adopted at this congress established nationalism, populism, statism (étatisme), secularism, revolutionaryism and republicanism as the country’s as well as the CHP’s principles. CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Tüzük ve Program Komisyonlarınca Onanlan Program Taslakları [Draft Programme Approved by the By-Laws and Programme Commissions of CHP’s Fourth General Congress] (Ankara, 12 May 1935), p.4; CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultay Görüşmeleri Tutarlaşısı [Records of the sessions of CHP’s Fourth General Congress] (Ankara, 9–16 May 1935), p.44.


30. Members of the Society for the Study of Turkish History (eds), Türk Tarihinin Ana

32. Ibid., p.8.
33. İnan, p.352; Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatlarına Methal, p.38.
35. Ibid., p.6.
36. Ibid.
37. Yeni Türk Lûgati, p.638.
38. İstatistik Yıllığı I'nci Cilt 1929, pp.65-6; İstatistik Yıllığı Cilt 10, p.89.
39. The treaties were signed on 30 October 1923 with Greece; on 18 October 1925 with Bulgaria; and on 4 September 1926 with Romania. For the text of the treaties with Greece and Bulgaria, see İskân Tarihçesi [A History of Resettlement] (Istanbul: Hamit Matbaası, 1932), pp.6 and 8–13. For the treaty with Romania, consult ‘Türkiye ile Romanya Arasında Münakcid Dobrudaki Türk Ahalinin Muhaciriyetini Tanzim Eden Mukavemettenin Tasdiki Hakkndaki Kanun’ (Law to Ratify the Treaty Cosigned by Turkey and Romania to Regulate the Emigration of the Turkish Population in the Dobrudja), No.3102, 25 Jan. 1937, Düstur, 3rd edn, Vol.18, pp.252–270.
40. ‘İskân Kanunu’ [Resettlement Law], No.885, 31 May 1926, Düstur, 3rd edn, Vol.7, p.1441. In their usage of the word hars (culture) the Kemalists were inspired by Mehmet Ziya (Gükalp) (1876–1924), one of the founding fathers of Turkish nationalism. Gükalp wrote extensively on the definition of the Turkish nation. According to him, the nation was a community of individuals, who were united by a shared culture, which was based on common education, language, morality and aesthetics. Ziya Gükalp, Türkçülüğün Esaslari [The Principles of Turkism] (Istanbul: TTK, 1952), p.15. Gükalp downplayed ethnicity and defined the nation through language, religion and shared values. The Kemalists used this definition frequently during the 1920s. Consequently, in this resettlement law of 1926, which mentioned Turkish hars (culture), the word hars referred to Islam and the Turkish language, among other things. However, while Islam was a significant part of the definition of the nation in the 1920s, this was not the case in the 1930s. During 1930s, when Kemalism became staunchly secular, it excluded religion from the official definition of the nation. This represented a break with Gükalp: Aktar, pp.103–8; Bali, Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri, pp.502–3; Taha Parla, Kemalist Tek-Parti Ideolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u [Kemalist Single-Party Ideology and the Republican People’s Party’s Six Arrows] (Istanbul: İletişim, 1995), pp.176–221.
41. ‘İskân Kanunu’, No.885, p.1441.
42. The resettlement of Kurds from eastern Turkey to western Turkey had been a common

44. Ibid., p.1156.
45. Ibid.
46. My readings of the Kemalist documents indicate that High Kemalism often employed the term ‘race’ in its conventional nineteenth-century usage, when this term was synonymous with nation. During the early twentieth century, Nazism and other racist ideologies transformed the term race, with modifiers such as biology, genetics, bloodline and physical attributes. However, the Kemalist usage of the word ‘race’ stayed close to its nineteenth-century meaning: in Turkish documents of the 1930s, race denotes a line of ethnicity carried on by language, regardless of biological factors. For the fluctuating meaning of this term over time, see ‘race’ in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Boston, MA: American Heritage Publishing, 1975), p.1075.
47. ‘İskân Kanunu’, No.2510, p.1157–8.
48. Ibid., p.1157.
49. Ibid., p.1159.
50. Ibid., p.1158.
52. ‘İskân Kanunu’, No.2510, p.1158.
55. Ibid.
56. Karapapaks are a Sunni Muslim community from Turkic Azerbaijan, which is mostly Shi’ite Muslim. Karapapaks speak a dialect of Turkish, which is closely related to Turkish and Azerbaijani. For more on the Karapapaks in Turkey, see Andrews and Benninghaus, pp.74–6.
57. Lezgis are a non-Turkish Muslim ethnic group from Daghestan in eastern Caucasus (in Turkey, however, the word Lezgi is a generic term for all people of Daghestani descent). Chechens are non-Turkish Muslims from the north Caucasus. Together with the Ingush, to whom they are closely related, they constitute the north-east Caucasian family. The Abkhazes are non-Turkish Muslims from north-eastern Georgia. They are linguistically and ethnically related to the Circassians, with whom they make up the north-western group of the Caucasian family. The Lezgis, Chechens and Abkhazes have, historically, identified with the Turks vis-à-vis Christian Russia. This explains their immigration to Anatolia following Russian expansion into the Caucasus between the 1850s and 1860s. For more on the Lezgis, Chechens and Abkhazes see, respectively, Andrews and Benninghaus, pp.105–7, 172–3 and 167–71.