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FOUNDED IN MEMORY OF CHAIM WEIZMANN

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AND OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN PALESTINE
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The Institute for Zionist Research founded in memory of Chaim Weizmann was set up in 1962 at Tel-Aviv University through the initiative and with the assistance of the Executive of the World Zionist Organization, with the aim of furthering the research and the teaching of the history of the Zionist idea, the Zionist movement and the Land of Israel in modern times

CONTENTS

SUMMARIES

FINANCING THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

By Izhak Greenberg

How to finance the War of Independence was a question of prime importance at a time when the Yishuv was fighting for its existence.

Direct local expenditures were 66.9 million Israeli Pounds (IL). Of this, IL66.3 million was spent by the Haganah and the later by the State of Israel, and half a million by other underground military organizations. The largest amount went for soldier's pay and other personal remuneration, equipment, munitions, construction and fortifications, production and food.

Expenditures abroad totalled $78.3 million, of which $73.8 million was spent by the Haganah and later the Israel Defence Forces. The remaining $4.5 million was spent by other underground military organizations. The money was used to acquire rifles, machine guns, artillery, tanks, airplanes and munitions.

The major sources of funds for local expenditures were government bonds, a national loan, budgeted income, and short–term government bonds sold to the banks (which meant, in effect, that the government was printing money). Fund–raising campaigns, especially in the United States, were the major source for expenditures abroad.

Throughout the war, there was a gap between the war needs and the available funds. This made it necessary to draw up national and military priorities. On the national level, priority was given to the war effort. On the military level, priority was given to supplying the immediate needs for victory on the battlefield.

THE HEARINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF UNSCOP IN PALESTINE

By Yehoshua Freundlich

When the Palestine problem was referred to the United Nations in 1947, very few people believed that the organization could cope with it. A special assembly, convened to discuss the matter, decided to send

a committee to Palestine to study the situation and present recommendations. This decision reflected the members' confusion and their desire to delay action; it strengthened the conviction of those who doubted whether the U.N. could solve the problem.

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine arrived in the Summer of 1947, during severe tensions between Jews and Arabs, and between the Jewish community and the British Mandatory power. The U.N.'s prestige and the personal traits of the UNSCOP members (all of whom represented countries that had no direct involvement in the conflict) gave much stature to the Committee. The Arabs boycotted the hearings, and the British cooperated only in a cold, formal manner; this helped put the Zionist representatives and their evidence in a favorable light.

UNSCOP concluded that there were two separate communities in Palestine, both ready for self-government – but unable to cooperate except in the economic sphere. The Committee recommended political partition of the country, and the creation of an economic union between the two parts. A minority proposal called for creation of a federation dominated by the Arab majority.

Even those who had voiced doubts about the Committee had to admit that it had quickly grasped the situation in Palestine, and that its majority recommendation was the only feasible proposal. The recommendation was endorsed by the U.N., and later by the United States and the Soviet Union – thus giving legitimacy to the idea of partition, and turning the U.N. into the prime arena for discussing Palestine.

SHAPING ISRAELI POLICY FOR THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION CONFERENCE IN LAUSANNE, 1949

By Yemima Rosenthal

The Palestine Conciliation Conference, convened in Lausanne by the Conciliation Commission in the Summer of 1949, was a total failure. State documents recently opened to the public give details of the

controversy within the Israeli Government over the development of a policy toward the Conference, and point to the reasons behind its failure.

The two major issues on the agenda were the refugees and the future of the West Bank. Recently, writers have referred to a basic disagreement between David Ben–Gurion and Moshe Sharett on the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. In contrast, however, the documents show that the positions of both men were marked by dualism, and that both of them (like many other policy–makers in the Israeli political/military establishment), were uncertain of the policy that Israel should adopt.

This article discusses the positions of members of the Government and the parties in the Knesset, and especially the attitudes of the three most prominent people involved: Ben–Gurion, Sharett and Eliahu Sasson. It analyzes the failure of the Conference against the background of the intricate political situation of the time.

"THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION": BEN–GURION'S POLITICAL OUTLOOK DURING WORLD WAR I PRIOR TO THE BALFOUR DECLARATION

By Matityahu Minc

Poalei–Zion leaders in the United States were embroiled in an ideological controversy during World War I. On one side were supporters of the "historical conception" pushed by Ben–Gurion, Izhak Ben–Zvi, Shlomo Kaplansky and others. On the other side were those who accepted the "political conception"; most notable were Ber Borochov, Nahman Syrkin and Pinhas Rutenberg (who became increasingly involved in Poalei–Zion affairs).

The historical conception held that the war would not change the political status of Palestine. Therefore, Zionist aspirations could be achieved only within the sovereign framework of the Ottoman Empire in a slow, evolutionary process. The drawn–out development of the Yishuv would gradually change the political status of Palestine; then

Jews would attain political rights, including the right of free immigration.

The political conception, on the other hand, called for using the war situation to change the political status of Palestine and to ensure preferential conditions for Jewish settlement. The changed status was defined in terms ranging from a Jewish republic to a Jewish national home.

Behind these conflicting conceptions, was support for (or opposition to) the Germans. A neutral policy was most suitable to Germany, and most compatible with its interests among the Jews.

AMERICAN ZIONISM AND UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY FROM SEPTEMBER 1939 TO PEARL HARBOR

By Menahem Kaufman

When World War II broke out in 1939, the United States' policy of neutrality posed a severe dilemma for American Zionists. If they openly identified with the Allied struggle against Hitler, who had declared a war of annihilation against the Jewish people, they feared that such an act emphasizng their Jewish identity would be interpreted as being un–American. They felt that non–Jewish Americans (especially anti–Semites and the increasingly powerful isolationists) would consider them to be foreigners who gave precedence to their own interests over those of the country.

Britain's White Paper policy in Palestine presented American Zionists with another dilemma. The World Zionist Organization wanted them to influence the Roosevelt Administration to press for a change in the British policy. But the Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs claimed that since the British were fighting the Nazis, nothing should be done to impair the British war effort.

For these reasons, American Zionist leaders decided to keep a low profile. They refrained from presenting the Administration with Jewish demands, and took only very limited steps to meet the expectations of the world movement.

As conditions in Europe changed, the low-profile policy had its ups and downs. During the first stage of the war, fears of a backlash kept American Zionists from demanding that the Administration intervene on behalf of the Jews. After the fall of France, American Jews were in such a state of panic that all initiatives were paralyzed. When Britain showed signs of surviving the struggle against Hitler, the Emergency Committee's public relations campaign picked up somewhat under the leadership of Emanuel Neumann with the help of Abba Hillel Silver. But the Emergency Committee as a whole, under the leadership of Stephen S. Wise, did not mount a serious political campaign during the second half of 1941.

American Zionists, like all American Jews, supported Roosevelt in the 1940 election. They did not even consider using the Jewish vote to achieve Zionist objectives, although Silver was one of the few exceptions. American Zionists participated actively in the campaign against anti-Semitism, but their tactics were the same as those of other American Jews: they were first and foremost Americans, and did not stress their Jewish identity or Jewish interests.

When Britain's Land Transfer Regulations were published in February 1940, limiting land acquisition by Jews, American Zionists preferred to "shout silently." When illegal immigrants were to be exiled to Mauritius after the S.S. Patria sank in Haifa Bay, American Zionists did not try to have Washington pressure London into changing its policy. American Zionists did not demand that the British create Jewish military units to fight under the Zionist flag, and that American Jews be permitted to volunteer for such units. Even in 1941, the leaders of the Emergency Committee refrained from turning to the media and to American public opinion, although there was a slight change for the better early in the year.

Palestinian Zionist emissaries to the United States criticized American Zionist policy during these years. Even Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion concluded that the World Zionist Organization could not depend on the Emergency Committee.

After Pearl Harbor, American Zionism faced a new question: when the American nation was mobilizing all its resources for the war effort, were American Zionists justified in expending resources on specifically Zionist objectives?

TERMINOLOGY AND REALITY IN THE HISTORY OF THE KIBBUTZ

By Henry Near

The origin and development of the term "kibbutz" throws light on the history and concepts of communal settlement groups in Palestine, over and above the narrow field of semantics. This type of group within the labor movement took shape toward the end of 1913, long before the onset of the Third Aliya.

Pioneering movements in the Diaspora played a decisive role in the gradual development of the word "kibbutz" into a more encompassing term. Throughout the 1930s, these pioneers believed strongly that the kibbutz movement – whether united or divided by dissension – was one.

These are minutia in a historical pattern whose broad outlines are well known. By collecting these details and fitting them into the general framework, we acquire a more complete understanding of the development of the kibbutz movement.

ATTITUDES TOWARD EMIGRATION DURING THE THIRD ALIYA

By Baruch Ben-Avram

Emigration from Palestine – yeridah in Zionist terminology – is a phenomenon which has accompanied the Zionist enterprise since its inception. The pioneers who left Palestine prior to World War I were derided as "weak and feeble" by those who remained, and were sometimes even considered to be traitors.

On the whole, however, yeridah was accepted as an understandable phenomenon. Political and economic conditions in Palestine were difficult. Even a fanatically enthusiastic Zionist such as the young Ben-Gurion concluded that only two types of laborers could survive: those who possessed a strong will, and those with exceptional physical strength who were used to hard work.

During the Third Aliya, which followed the euphoria generated by the Balfour Declaration, large numbers of pioneers arrived in the country. At the same time, yeridah gained momentum. The reaction to this emigration mixed. On one hand, the two labor parties were happy to see members of the "Old Yishuv" leave – because the oldtimers were not considered to be conductive to the establishment of a new and pioneering community.

On the other hand, the labor movement denounced the young pioneers who left the country – even those who did so temporarily in order to study abroad. According to the movement, this desire for education reflected an over–involvement in spiritual matters – a typical Diaspora tendency from which Zionism was striving to free the Jewish People. Ze'ev Jabotinsky, however, held a more tolerant viewpoint on this issue.

The economic crisis of 1922–23 was a catalyst that encouraged emigration, but it was commonly accepted that economic conditions were not the only factor. Faith in the future of Palestine played a major role in the decisions of those who chose to remain.

INSTITUTIONAL PREPARATIONS FOR ABSORBING URBAN MIDDLE–CLASS GERMAN IMMIGRANTS IN PALESTINE, 1933-35

By Amiram Oren

During the 1920s, Zionist organizations in Palestine focused on property–less young immigrants who had some agricultural training and had arrived voluntarily; these were placed in agricultural settlements. When immigration from Germany began in 1933, the organizations had no program for absorbing urban, middle–class people with academic or professional backgrounds – most of whom came involuntarily. By the end of the decade, there was still no overall program for meeting the special needs of this new type of immigrant, although the Zionist movement had taken some steps in this direction.

When the first Germans arrived, the Zionist organizations formed

the United Committee for the Settlement of German Jews in Eretz Yisrael. A subcommittee headed by Arthur Ruppin was charged with preparing an ad-hoc plan for placing middle-class immigrants in agricultural settlements. The subcommittee published a brochure listing the various types of settlements and the amounts of capital required, and distributed the brochure in Germany.

In the fall of 1933, the Eighteenth Zionist Congress created the Central Office for the Settlement of German Jews in Eretz Yisrael (popularly known as the German Department). Although it was officially part of the Jewish Agency, the German Department was financially independent. The activities of the United Committee gradually decreased, and finally stopped.

One of the first items on the agenda of the German Department was the absorption of middle-class immigrants in agricultural settlements. Apparently, the Department did not intend to create a new type of settlement; rather, it adapted existing types to the special needs of these immigrants. Between 1933 and 1935, the Department established three settlements: (1) Kfar Bialik, a suburban settlement on Jewish National Fund land in the Haifa Bay area; (2) Kfar Yedidya, part of a wider program in the Emek Hefer region; and (3) Gan Shomron, on private land near the colony of Karkur. Despite their differences, all three had a common organizational feature they were cooperatives.

THE PALMAH OR THE JEWISH BRIGADE? PARTY CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCE THE YOUTH MOVEMENTS

By Uri Ben-Eliezer

The youth movements in Palestine originated in the 1920s as a revolt against modern urban social patterns and traditional Jewish life-patterns in the Diaspora. Animated by a sense of rebellion and a belief that they were endowed with special qualities that could be transferred to society as a whole, the youth movements jealously

preserved a relatively high level of independence from the older generations.

This independence could not last for long in the Yishuv, whose social patterns were, to a great extent, shaped by political considerations. By the 1940s, the movements had become pawns in the political contests among the parties and kibbutz movements. They were especially influenced by the struggle for hegemony within the ranks of Mapai; one of the majorconfrontations was over security policy.

The majority in Mapai preferred to have the young men join the British Army – and, later, the Jewish Brigade when it was established in 1944. The minority, most of whom belonged to Hakibbutz Hameuhad, favored the Palmah; this was a paramilitary organization formed in 1941, small in numbers but independent of the British military establishment.

Hamahanot Haolim was an indigenous Palestinian youth movement that became politicized like the others. As early as 1942, party considerations were predominant; two factions emerged – one loyal to the majority group in Mapai, and one that supported Hakibbutz Hameuhad. When a split occurred in Mapai, it was soon followed by a similar division in the youth movement.

In February 1945, about a month and a half before the split, Hamahanot Haolim had to decide whether to join the Jewish Brigade, as ordered by the Zionist organizations, or the Palmah. After listening to Moshe Shertok (Sharett), who appealed for volunteers to the Jewish Brigade, the members agreed to allot a quota to the British. But after hearing Israel Galili and Yigal Allon of Hakibbutz Hameuhad, they changed their minds and decided to conscript members for the Palmah alone.

This article is, in effect, the minutes of the debate on the question. It shows how a political controversy penetrated the youth movement, and how Hamahanot Haolim members lost the ability to make independent decisions in matters that concerned them.

THE CONTROVERSY IN THE POLITICAL PRESS OVER THE KASZTNER TRIAL

By Ronny Stauber

Malkiel Gruenwald publicly accused Dr. Israel Kasztner, a Hungarian Zionist leader, of collaboration with the Nazis. After a seven-month libel trial in Jerusalem that began January 1, 1954, Judge Binyamin Halevi acquitted Gruenwald of most of the charges, ruling that Kasztner had "sold his soul to the devil."

Gruenwald's counsel, Shmuel Tamir, used the trail to undermine the political hegemony of Mapai. Radical opposition newspapers - the daily *Herut* and the weekly *Haolam Hazeh* - became, to some extent, organs for the defense. Tamir and the newspapers put the blame on the entire wartime Zionist leadership – the heads of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, and particularly the Mapai leaders. According to Tamir, the failure of Zionist leaders to help European Jewry induced officials of the Jewish communities, such as Kasztner, to follow the terrible path of collaboration.

Judge Halevi's harsh verdict against Kasztner was followed by a sharp controversy in the political press. The parties used the affair as a political weapon on the eve of the elections to the Third Knesset. At the same time, there was a searching analysis of the Jewish reaction to the Holocaust. Although Kasztner was not a member of the *Judenrat*, his negotiations with the Germans and his readiness to turn in some Jews in order to save others were equated with the activities of the *Judenrat*.

Politicians and intellectuals debated whether there were two possible – and opposite - reactions to Nazi policy: (1) that of the *Judenrat*, characterized as criminal collaboration with the enemy, and (2) that of the youth movement, characterized as heroic resistance. Israel Galili, Moshe Carmel, Izhak Gruenbaum, Matti Meged and other leading personalities expressed their absolute revulsion at *Judenrat* policy as they understood it. There was a strong tendency to hold up the ghetto resistance fighters as an example to Jewish youth.

The opposite view was expressed by poet Nathan Alterman, who cautioned against a collective, categorical indictment of the *Judenrat*;

to consider the *Judenrat* as the opposite of the underground movements was both artificial and historically inaccurate. With Alexander Barzel of Kfar Hahoresh, Alterman warned against using terms borrowed from life in Israel to judge the manner in which Jews coped with events in the ghettos. Those who were not there could not judge what happened.

The Kasztner Affair was the first painful attempt by the young Jewish state to face up to the events of the recent past.

At the core of the debate was the question: how could six million Jews have gone unresisting to their deaths? The court's verdict supplied an unequivocal answer: Kasztner and the corrupt heads of the *Judenrat* had kept the people under control, and prevented mass resistance. Only the youth movements took a different course of action and became a symbol of Jewish courage.

This view, which had already become prevalent among the Israeli public, was reinforced by the Kasztner Affair. Since the Eichmann trial, however, there has been a different tendency: to try to understand rather than to judge.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION TO THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ARGENTINA, 1897–1947

By Silvia Schenkolewski (Tractinsky)

Until the beginning of World War II, the World Zionist Organization considered Argentine Jewry to be no more than a source of financial support; their delegates to the Zionist Congresses were of secondary importance. But when the majority of European Jewry was lost to the WZO, the importance of the Jewish communities in Latin America increased. A contributing factor was the growing importance of the Latin American countries themselves in international affairs.

Zionist emissaries in Argentina called for programs of education and indoctrination. The Pan-American Jewish Congress (1941), the establishment of the Latin American Department of the Jewish Agency in

the United States (1943), the first Latin American Zionist Congress (1945) and the foundation of Committees for Palestine reflected the changed attitude toward Latin American Jewry.

In anticipation of the U.N. vote on partitioning Palestine, representatives of the Jewish Agency, the DAIA and the Supreme Zionist Council tried to influence Jewish and non–Jewish public opinion in Argentina. The Argentine authorities recognized the DAIA as the representative organization of Argentine Jewry. The Jewish Agency mobilized Argentine Jewish personalities in the campaign to support the U.N. resolution.

A Jewish Agency office was established in Buenos Aires to handle public relations, educational and youth activities on the eve of the creation of the State of Israel. This was the final stage in the process by which the WZO came to recognize the importance of Latin American Jewry, and particularly the Jewish community of Argentina.

KHANS OR ESTATES? SITES PURCHASED FOR JEWISH COLONIES IN PALESTINE, 1882-1914

By Yossi Ben–Artzi, Ruth Kark, Ran Aaronson

The estate is considered to be one of the basic types of rural settlements. Although estates existed in Palestine during various periods of history, none has been identified as dating from the modern period. This thesis may account for that gap in time.

The remains of massive buildings can be found throughout the countryside. Documentary sources call them khans (wayside inns or caravansaries). They include a large yard bounded on at least two sides by long stone buildings, and on the other sides by a wall. Khans served as the first homesteads for the founders of Jewish settlements, such as those of Hadera, Sejera, Kinneret and Jedda; lesser–known khans include those of Kfar Uriyya, Givat Ada and Ez–Zerghaniyeh. Several of these have disappeared, but many still exist.

Documentary and cartographic evidence, plus a field study by the authors, show that the buildings were constructed in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. However, the same sources raise serious doubts about the ability of these buildings to serve as wayside inns. Neither their distance from the major roads of Palestine, nor their geographical distribution, is compatible with such a function. With the exception of the khan at Motza, there is no evidence that any of those studied ever served as a caravansary (as did, for example, the khans of the Mameluke period).

On the other hand, evidence shows that every building served as a grain storehouse, and as the residence of the agent (wakil). Quite a few of the sites also served as stables, as storehouses for agricultural equipment, and as residences of tenant farmers; these functions are indicated in the smaller, simpler sites such as those at Zichron Ya'akov, Yesud Hamaala and Emek Hefer.

The authors suggest that the "khans" and other such sites were actually parts of large estates. The owners were local urban capitalists who combined small tracts of land into large estates, erected these buildings, and cultivated their land through agents and tenant farmers in an innovative economic enterprise.

COOPERATION AMONG JEWISH COMPANIES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN LAND ACQUISITION IN PALESTINE, 1900-1914

By Yoseph Katz

Quite a few Jewish companies and organizations were involved in acquiring agricultural land in Palestine during 1900-1914. Most were Zionist, including the Jewish National Fund, the Palestine Land Development Company, and private companies. Non–Zionist organizations included the Jewish Colonization Association. Their combined efforts transferred about 184,000 dunams to Jewish ownership in these years.

Various historical or organizational reasons were behind the large number of organizations. Sometimes the purchase of land was only one of an organization's activities. For reasons of prestige existing companies were not disbanded when new ones were founded. There was no higher, all–Jewish forum to coordinate their activities.

Against this background, the day–to–day cooperation among the companies was impressive. Jockeying for prestige and hegemony could have led to intense competition. But they recognized that cooperation was necessary to achieve their colonizing and national–Zionist objectives. This prevented competition, fostered cooperation, and created a division of labor. Their cooperative attitude was abetted by the fact that most of them were not motivated by profit.

תמצית המאמרים באנגלית